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Keynes, Chicago and Friedman  
 
Chapter 43: Towards a Resolution of the Dispute 
 
… it would be interesting to know whether there was a line of influence running from 
Keynes (1923) to Chicago (1934).   
 
Robert Skidelsky (1992, 579, n) John Maynard Keynes The Economist as Saviour 
1920-1937  
 
Robert Leeson 
 
8 May 2002 
 
43.1 Overview 
Prior to Don Patinkin’s assault on Milton Friedman, the major dispute over 
macroeconomic lineage (and bastardry) related to John Maynard Keynes, not to 
Henry Simons and Lloyd Mints.  Patinkin was a major participant in both disputes.  
Joan Robinson’s (1962a, 690-1) first used the term “Bastard Keynesianism” in print in 
1962.  Simultaneously, Patinkin sought to establish the legitimate tradition of both 
Keynes and the Chicago Fathers.    
 
Patinkin asserted that Keynes supported the Walrasian general equilibrium (IS-LM) 
interpretation of the General Theory.  In contrast, Axel Leijonhufvud (1969 [1968], 
302) accused Patinkin and his fellow general equilibrium theorists of providing “a 
seriously misleading framework for the interpretation of Keynes’ theory”.  Robert 
Clower (1969 [1965], 270, 295-6, 283) argued that Patinkin was carrying forward this 
“Keynesian counter-revolution … with such vigour”.  But in Clower’s view this 
vigour was not accompanied by rigour: “much of what now passes for useful theory is 
not only worthless economics (and mathematics), but also a positive hindrance to 
fruitful theoretical and empirical work”.  Patinkin was guilty of “ad hoc theorizing – 
inventing a solution to a problem which has actually been evaded rather than Ong 
resolved”.i   
 
Patinkin objected to what he regarded as ‘history-mining’ to add respectability to 
contemporary policy recommendations.  Thus Patinkin (1980, 25, 23) advised 
economists to “cut the umbilical cord to Keynes”.  According to Patinkin (1989, 235-
6, 211) in the 1960s attempts were made to “identify Keynes’ theory with that of the 
‘Modern Cambridge School’ [and] to invoke Keynes’ authority for the more radical 
policy views of this School”.  This involved driving “a wedge” between “the 
economics of Keynes” and those who were denigrated as “bastard Keynesians”.  
Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 133-4, 18) approved of this wedge.  For him, 
“Keynes was a true Marshallian in method”.  Friedman (1970, 7-8) also asserted that 
“if Keynes were alive today he would no doubt be at the forefront of the [monetarist] 
counter-revolution.  You must never judge a master by his disciples”.  
 
The chapters in Part Four fall into four sections.  The first three chapters represent 
Patinkin’s ongoing scholarly interest in explaining the evolution of Keynes’ 
economics and his relationship to the Chicago economists.  In his Sir Dennis 
Robertson lecture, Patinkin (chapter 44 [1974], 4, 27, 12) explained that he was using 
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the term “Keynesian monetary theory” in contrast to “the quantity theory” to describe 
“the General Theory and the literature to which it gave rise – though I should note 
that the aspect of the theory that is my primary concern here (namely, the treatment of 
money from the viewpoint of the choice of an optimum portfolio) is in some respects 
more precisely developed in Keynes’ Treatise on Money … There is no doubt that 
Keynes of the General Theory is at one with Keynes of the Tract (1923, pp.78-9) in 
taking as his point of departure the individual’s demand for money holdings”.   
 
Patinkin explained that his general approach to doctrinal history was that “isolated 
passages do not a theory make”.  Therefore the crucial distinction between the 
Cambridge School and the Keynesian School was that the latter – but not the former – 
recognised the “implications of the optimal-portfolio approach”.  Patinkin cited 
Robertson’s (1928, 37) reference to the choice-theoretic marginal calculation 
underpinning an individual’s demand for money but concluded that “the Cambridge 
economists did not recognise the full implications of the optimum-portfolio approach 
to monetary theory; they did not really integrate it into their thinking”.  Patinkin 
(chapter 44 [1974], 10) also argued that “the novelty of Keynesian monetary theory” 
related to the distinction between stocks and flows.  However, Robertson (1928, 29) 
explained that “we can fix our attention either on the stock of money in existence at a 
given point in time, or on the flow of money being used during a given period of time.  
Each of these procedures has its own advantages, and it will be well to be familiar 
with both of them before we are done” [Robertson’s emphases].  Patinkin interspersed 
his lecture with “various facetious remarks” – mostly aimed at Milton Friedman.        
   
Chapter 45 is a review of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: From The 
Tract to the General Theory.  According to Patinkin (chapter 45 [1975], 254-5, 257-8, 
269) “‘monetary theory’ in the Treatise means, first and foremost, a theory that 
explains the determination of the price level”.  Patinkin interpreted Keynes as a co-
author of the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis: “the General Theory is not a static 
theory of unemployment equilibrium but a dynamic theory of disequilibrium” 
[emphasis in original].  Patinkin also appropriated Keynes as a keen econometrician: a 
pioneer in estimation of reduced form models (see also Patinkin 1976).   
 
Patinkin (1979, 156) thought that it was “essential’ to realise that “Keynes did not live 
in the world of academe.  He was not a professor”.  Patinkin (chapter 45 [1975], 254, 
267, 269) noted that the Treatise was “designed to firmly establish his academic 
reputation”.  Patinkin sought to encourage the reading of the General Theory but to 
discourage the reading of the Treatise: “least enjoyable as a reading experience is the 
Treatise … I can (from the viewpoint of macroeconomic theory) see little profit (and 
certainly no pleasure) from reading it today … one cannot help the feeling that it 
represents a Keynes out of character: a Keynes attempting to act the role of a 
Professor, and a Germanic one at that”.ii  In contrast, in the General Theory “we once 
again find the true Keynes … the stirring voice of a prophet who has seen a new truth, 
and who is convinced that it – and only it – can save a world deep in the throes of 
crisis.  It is a sharp polemical voice directed at converting economists all over the 
world to the new dispensation – and combating the false prophets among them who 
perversely continue with the erroneous teachings of the earlier gods whom Keynes 
had already abandoned”.       
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Keynes visited the University of Chicago in June-July 1931 to attend the Harris 
Foundation lectures and seminars on ‘Unemployment as a World Problem’ (Wright 
1931a).  In his Henry Simons Lecture on “Keynes and Chicago”, Patinkin (chapter 46 
[1979/1981], 290-1, 299) ridiculed the simplicity of the “obscure” and “strange” 
notation of Keynes “fundamental equation!”  In his discussion of the Chicago reviews 
of the General Theory, Patinkin noted that Frank Knight framed his criticism of 
Keynes’ theory of liquidity preference in the context of an optimal portfolio analysis.  
This style of analysis “does not appear in earlier Chicago writings on money, and so 
can itself be regarded as reflecting the influence of Keynes’ theory of liquidity 
preference – an influence that was to manifest itself in” Friedman’s writings.        
 
The next four chapters capture the response of Jacob Viner, Henry Simons and Knight 
to Keynes’ and his General Theory (chapter 47 [1932]; chapter 48 [1936/1964]; 
chapter 49 [1936]; chapter 50 [1937]).  The following three chapters are part of a 
post-war symposium on monetary policy between Mints and Alvin Hansen, with a 
commentary by Howard Ellis (chapters 51-53 [1946]).  Chapter 54 is a previously 
unpublished essay which attempts to resolve aspects of the dispute by examining 
Friedman’s lecture notes and readings from Mints’ Economics 330 in 1932-3.   
 
43.2 The Evolving Chicago Response to Keynes and the Keynesians   
While Keynes’ Treatise on Money (1930) was apparently welcomed in Chicago, his 
General Theory (1936) was not.  This appears to be true even for Paul Douglas, who 
was regarded as being on the left-wing component of the Chicago spectrum.  Douglas 
(1931, 9; 1933a, 80) described the Treatise as “brilliant” and “the most stimulating 
single work on money”.iii   But he was “not convinced” by “the school of thought … 
based on Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”.  Instead, 
Douglas (1972, 455) preferred a Treatise-style explanation: “the rate of interest was 
higher than the marginal productivity of capital”.      
 
The period following Keynes’ visit to Chicago was highly productive both for him 
(culminating in the General Theory and the Keynesian revolution) and for Simons (it 
corresponded with the effective beginning of his publishing career).  After the 
publication of the General Theory, Keynes became a widely “hated” figure in some 
American circles (Harrod 1951, 448-9).  Since Friedman learnt monetary economics 
at Chicago before this period it is important to precisely delineate the chronology and 
the components of this North American animosity towards Keynes and his disciples.   
 
Before the General Theory Keynes and the Chicago economists had begun to proceed 
down divergent evolutionary paths as a section of the Cambridge school evolved into 
the Keynesian school.  Keynes’ journey reflected, in part, the influences of two young 
disciples, Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson.  They (together with Austin Robinson, 
Pierro Sraffa and James Meade) were “among the irritants” that propelled Keynes 
from the Treatise to the General Theory (Austin Robinson 1992, 211).  They were 
also among the irritants in the oyster that created the anti-Keynesian reaction.    
 
The February 1946 Employment Act was perceived as having “in effect, enacted 
Keynesian policies into law” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 122).  In September 
1946 Friedman returned to Chicago after a gap of eleven years.  In between these two 
dates both Keynes and Henry Simons died: Keynes on 21 April 1946 aged 62, and 
Simons on 19 June 1946 aged 46, apparently by suicide (Coase 1993, 244; Friedman 
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and Friedman 1998, 155).  The post war configuration was, in part, a dispute between 
the heirs of Keynes and the heirs of Simons. 
 
There were at least five overlapping aspects to the anti-Keynesian reactions.  First, 
there were some personal elements.  Secondly, there was the political dimension of 
Keynesianism.  Thirdly, there was an irritation at the manner in which Keynes and the 
Keynesians ridiculed their “classical” predecessors.  Fourthly, there was some 
resistance to the replacement of the quantity theory by the income-expenditure-
multiplier.  Finally, there was the contribution that Keynes made to policies such as 
tariffs and protection. 
 
With respect to personal characteristics, economists sometimes see themselves as 
exerting an influence in the evolution of world history; but few would portray 
themselves individually as playing an heroic but tragic role in such a cosmic drama.  
Keynes (JMK IX [1931], xvii), however, published a volume almost entitled Essays 
in Prophesy and Persuasion.  Dropping the “Prophesy” from the title he nevertheless 
claimed to have been a tortured Cassandra since the publication of the Economic 
Consequences of the Peace “painfully conscious that a cloud of witnesses would rise 
up against me and very few in my support”.   
 
Keynes’ attack on President Wilson in Economic Consequences of the Peace caused 
“particular resentment”.  Herbert Hoover regarded Keynes as “one of the most 
conceited men he had ever met” (Stein 1969, 134, 142).  Keynes retorted that 
“Attempts to humour or placate the Americans or anyone else seems quite futile” 
(Skidelsky 1983, 342, xxii).  Keynes had established himself as “a person to listen to”.  
But the New York Times suggested that Keynes’ attitude towards foreigners equated to 
Samuel Johnson’s remark that “So far as I can see, foreigners are mostly fools” 
([1926] cited by Stein 1969, 134, 484, n33).   
 
With respect to his opponents, Keynes often saw stubborn reactionaries, not highly 
endowed with intelligence.  In March 1933, he wrote to Kahn (who was then in the 
U.S.) that “it seems hardly an exaggeration that there are no longer any serious 
obstacles to a reasonable policy, except Neville Chamberlain, Hilton Young and, 
perhaps, the Governor [of the Bank of England]”.  When Chamberlain, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, invited Keynes to discuss some of his recent articles, Keynes wrote 
to Kahn: “Could it be that the Walls of Jericho are flickering?” (cited by Moggridge 
1992, 573).   
 
During a visit to the US in 1917, Keynes did not like what he found and made “a 
terrible impression for his rudeness” (JMK XVI [1918], 264).  He was not averse to 
ridiculing his disciples.  In 1934, during a third visit, Keynes received a visit at his 
hotel from Calvin Hoover (1965, 173, 125).  Using Keynes’ bathroom, Hoover’s 
careful use of only one towel was ridiculed by Keynes, who swept a bunch of clean 
towels to the floor so as to demonstrate how to stimulate the American economy.  
According to his disciple and first biographer, Keynes was “not predisposed to admire 
the American way of life”; his preferred style of “cultured” civilisation required 
“ample domestic service” (Harrod 1951, 4-5).iv      
 
Some of his more radical disciples displayed a similar propensity.  In 1936, Roy 
Harrod and Hubert Henderson complained that “2 people in Cambridge together with 
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a few undergraduates” were propagating the belief that those who did not accept the 
General Theory were “intellectually inferior beings” (cited by Clarke 1988, 308).  
Joan Robinson with her “bleak Cambridge rudeness” generated a mixture of intense 
admiration and irritation, with the latter perhaps the dominant reaction (Turner 1989; 
Skidelsky 1992, 538; Tobin 1972, 105; Tobin 1978, 452).v  In 1934, Kahn advised 
Robert Bryce (1996, 43) that when he took up his scholarship at Harvard he should 
boycott the lectures and seminars.   
 
Two years previously, Kahn travelled to America on a boat appropriately called 
“Majestic” (Marcuzzo 2001, 22).  From the USA, Kahn wrote to Joan Robinson and 
Keynes of his contemptuousness of Americans: “the people are so desperately dim, 
and far too frequently grubby into the bargain … in respect of society, I had to lower 
my standards considerably, in respect of both age, eminence, intelligence and quality 
… after watching the struggle of these wretched people I shall for the first time realise 
my good fortune in being a member of the King’s High Table, and take more pleasure 
in its society than I had in the past”.  Kahn was especially contemptuous of American 
academics: “I believe that Americans being what they are, it is only the unfitted who 
were relegated to academic life …  I feel that if I wanted to do academic work in the 
States the thing to do would be to get a job at one of their banks”.  At the University 
of Chicago, Kahn was disgusted by “the grubbiness of their style of living” and the 
“revolting food that is served up in all their halls and clubs” (15 February 1933, 8 
January 1933, 27 February 1933, cited by Marcuzzo 2001, 54-7).vi     
 
Kahn (15th January 1933) also reported to Joan Robinson that Viner tried to be 
“extremely contemptuous of Cambridge … Viner gave me proudly to understand that 
he never devotes more than an hour to the [Economic] Journal and was “very proud of 
not having read more than a few passages from the Treatise”.vii  Yet Viner (chapter 47 
[1932], 504) was (or had very recently been) full of praise for the diagnoses and 
remedies contained in Essays in Persuasion, which he described as being widely 
accepted as “substantially and brilliantly right”.  Moreover, Keynes stood “head and 
shoulders” above other economists as a “propagandist” whose work was “undiluted 
by academic scruples to disclose all the qualifications and the uncertainties of his 
logical argument”.  Keynes also displayed “fearlessness in assigning to his opponents 
their appropriately low intelligence quotas … Perhaps what the world has needed and 
most urgently needs today, is a few more Keynes”.  Viner had a reputation for being a 
ruthless teacher who sought to maintain the strictest standards by humiliating students 
(Domar 1992, 121; Minsky 1985, 218; Samuelson 1972, 5-6; Friedman and Friedman 
1998, 35; Stigler 1988, 19-20; Becker 1991, 145).  In 1932-3, Friedman attended Viner’s 
Economics 301 simultaneously with Mints’ 330; such praise of Keynes could only 
have added to the impression that the Treatise was of great significance.   
 
Viner (chapter 48 [1963], 256, 263, 266) later highlighted the distinction between the 
“heroic” Keynes of the 1940s and his American disciples.  He continued to express 
strong reservations about the General Theory.  Viner was not sympathetic to Keynes’ 
“after us the deluge” approach.  He objected to the mythology (expressed by Seymour 
Harris) that the Keynesian “truths” about the need for expansionary fiscal policy in 
times of depression needed to be “repeated hundreds of times before they made the 
required impression”.  Viner noted that he had made exactly that point in August 1931 
and that his Chicago colleagues did not need “to learn it from Keynes”.   
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With respect to the political dimension of Keynesianism, Schumpeter (1951, 287-8) 
saw sociological analogies between the Keynesian school and the Marxist school: “a 
group that professes allegiance to One Master and One Doctrine”.  Keynesianism 
became an especially suspect ideology during the post-war McCarthyite period.  
During the Great Inflation of the 1970s, The New Economics (Harris 1947) became 
associated with The New Inflation (Jones 1973).  In consequence, anti-Keynesianism 
became as virulent as anti-Communism.  Paul Sweezy (1996, 84, 78) reflected the 
early 1930s was a time of uninhibited discussion; later this freedom of association 
“came back to haunt people who weren’t very careful during the 1930s.  They were 
accused of being Communists and subversives”.  Sweezy was uncertain at which 
point prior to 1936 the term “Keynesian” became used as a “general nomenclature”, 
but it was clear that an economist could be “a kind of left wing socialist Keynesian or 
a conservative business Keynesian”.   
 
This aspect of the early Keynesian movement was apparent to Alvin Hansen by April 
1933.  Hansen’s view was that “it is wholly fallacious to assume that a government 
can, in a private capitalist economy, spend its way out of depression”.  Hansen added 
that there were similarities between Keynes’ Treatise and Marx’s Das Kapital: “Both 
the truth and the error have been used by ardent propagandists in the political arena to 
support practical policies in which they believe” (Hansen and Tout 1933, 342, 143).   
 
The radical nature of some Keynesians was apparent to Paul Sweezy (1996, 76, 78) 
who returned to Harvard in 1932 after a year at the London School of Economics 
(LSE).  Sweezy regarded himself at that time as “a Marxist and as a radical” but noted 
that Joan Robinson was “far to the left of many of the Marxists, in terms of her 
instincts and sympathies”.  Sweezy (1934, 805, 807) reviewing Pigou’s Theory of 
Unemployment in the JPE, noted that members of the “Cambridge” school had some 
“unpublished” arguments which purported to show that a reduction in nominal wages 
would not necessarily reduce real wages.  The neoclassical view would “receive the 
ascent of most economists”; the Cambridge school was interpreted as launching an 
assault on this paradigm.viii   
 
With respect to tariffs, on June 13th 1930, the Senate passed the Hawley-Smoot tariff, 
which the President signed four days later.  The previous month virtually every 
respectable American economist (including 1,038 AEA members) had signed a 
petition urging Congress to reject the bill (Hicks 1960, 220-2).  This led to what Paul 
Douglas (1972, 477) described as “a deadly international trade war”.  Albert Hart 
(1948, 370) described it as a “notable event” in the 1930s “‘economic warfare’.  This 
struggle was not merely one of the Nazis against the democratic powers, but a 
struggle in which ‘every man’s hand was against every other’”.  In their January 1932 
Memorandum on Anti Depression Policy, Lauchlin Currie, Paul Theodore Ellsworth 
and Harry Dexter White (chapter 42 [1932]) noted that since 1925 all major countries 
had revised upwards their tariff schedules which had caused “maladjustments which 
are now playing economic havoc … The United States has been in the forefront of the 
building up of tariff walls; it is only fitting that she take the lead in the downward 
revision so necessary to economic sanity”.    
 
In contrast, in July 1930, Keynes (JMK XX 378, 488, 494-5) advised the British 
Prime Minister that he had “become reluctantly convinced that some protectionist 
measures should be introduced”.  As his first biographer noted this was a “momentous 
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proposal”.  When Keynes arrived to give a talk at Oxford, Harrod’s (1951, 424-7) 
“face fell” upon hearing that he planned to speak in favour of a revenue tariff.  Harrod 
was so inconsolable that Keynes was obliged to talk about the much safer Treatise 
instead.  According to Skidelsky (1983, xxii), Harrod “believed that a bright future 
depended upon ‘selling’ Keynes to the United States.  This required downplaying all 
those aspects of Keynes’ character and thought likely to give offence across the 
Atlantic”.  Referring to Keynes’ advocacy of protection, Harrod  (1951, 428) asked: 
was Keynes “a little too ready to be an iconoclast?”    
 
Prior to his visit to Chicago in 1931, Keynes (JMK XX [1931], 523, 505, 501, 519) 
was obliged to defend his position.  Perceiving the choice to be between tariffs and 
exchange rate flexibility Keynes explained that “if I look into the bottom of my own 
heart, the feeling which I find there is … that a tariff is a crude departure from laissez-
faire, which we have to adopt because we have at present no better weapon in our 
hands, but that it will be superseded in time, not by a return to laissez-faire, but by 
some more comprehensive scheme of national planning”.  Keynes complained that 
“new paths of thought have no appeal to the fundamentalists of free trade … I appeal 
for a reconsideration of the whole matter with a fresh head, and a clear one”.  
 
Keynes’ 1930-31 advocacy of tariffs caused “a sensation” in Britain (JMK XX, 489).  
It also led to a rejoinder - Tariffs: the case examined - by a group of LSE economists 
under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge (1932).ix  Joan Robinson (1962b, 84, 
64) referred to this “great outcry against Keynes’ treachery towards Free Trade” and 
noted that Viner was the authority cited by the LSE economists.  Viner (chapter 47 
[1932]) argued that Keynes was “seriously wrong” in advocating that Britain join the 
“crowded ranks of tariff sinners” had “contributed greatly to a further weakening of the 
already waning faith of the English public in the virtues of free trade”.  For Simons 
(1948 [1944], 1213; 1943, 443-4), tariffs were part of the government sponsored 
“racketeering” which his “rules” were designed to thwart.  Simons sought to defend 
“Traditional Liberal Principles”; his “faith and hope” for the post war world rested on 
the construction of a “free-trade front”.      
 
Viner’s (chapter 48 [1963], 266) admiration for Keynes was qualified both by the 
General Theory and “the journalistic and polemical Keynes of the 1920’s and early 
1930’s”.  But judged by the reviews this animosity appeared not to cloud the reception 
to the Treatise.  Indeed, the only genuinely critical review of the Treatise came from 
Cambridge and from A.C. Pigou.  Pigou (1931, 544) complained that “There is too 
much carping at ‘current economic theory’ - whatever precisely that may be; too 
much adverse comment upon classes of persons, ‘the bankers’, ‘the financial press’, 
and so on, names not specified; too many naively patronising remarks.  It was, 
perhaps, a fault in Marshall that he discovered more truth in the writings of others 
than was actually there, and unduly depreciated his own contributions.  There is no 
fault of that kind in Mr. Keynes!”  Dimand (1988, 56) noted that this was an “extreme 
outlier among the reviewers”.   
 
In May 1931, Pigou (JMK XIII [1931], 214-8) wrote to Keynes indicating that he had 
suspected that the Treatise was purporting to offer a formula which “revealed price 
changes which could not be revealed by the ‘Cambridge equation’”.  Pigou was 
temporarily appeased.  But as word spread about the developments that would lead to 
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The General Theory, “spies ... members of the fifth column” from London came to 
listen to Keynes’ lectures (Austin Robinson 1947, 40).   
 
In 1934, Pigou gave a series of lectures at LSE, entitled Economics in Practice.  In his 
first lecture, Pigou (1935, 22-4) made several cryptic comments about developments 
in Keynes= career since Marshall's death: “Not long ago one of my most distinguished 
colleagues urged his fellow economists to ‘eschew the Treatise, pluck the day, fling 
pamphlets to the wind’ [a reference to JMK X [1924], 199].  A few years later he 
himself offered, and we gratefully received, a work with the title Treatise”.  Keynes 
was apparently compared, unfavourably, to Marshall, whose generosity to his 
predecessors, according to Pigou, was “a great man’s fault, not a little man’s … 
Controversy for its own sake is a prodigious waste of time ... Are we, in our secret 
hearts, wholly satisfied with the manner, or manners, in which some of our 
controversies are carried on?  A year or more ago, after the publication of an 
important book, there appeared an elaborate and careful critique of a number of 
particular passages in it.  The author’s answer was, not to rebut the criticisms, but to 
attack with violence another book, which the critic had himself written several years 
before!  Body line bowling!  The method of the duello!  That kind of thing is surely a 
mistake.  It is a mistake, not merely in general and in the abstract, but also for solid 
reasons of State.  Economists in this country lack influence which - in their own 
opinion - they ought to have, largely because the public believe that on all topics they 
are hopelessly divided.  Controversies conducted in the manner of Kilkenny cats do 
not help to dissipate this opinion”.   
 
Pigou (1949, 21) acknowledged that both the Treatise and the General Theory “broke 
that dogmatic slumber” which had descended upon interwar economics: “The period 
of tranquillity was ended … For this the credit is almost wholly due to Keynes”.  
Pigou (1953, 26-7) was also curious about “the explanation of the tone of Keynes's 
criticisms ... the red flags for bulls”.  Since autumn 1930, Keynes had been referring 
to Kahn as “the little priest” (Moggridge 1992, 532).  In his LSE lectures, Pigou 
(1935, 2) referred to the “priests” and “priestesses”, who regarded anyone in trade as 
“being essentially inferior to oneself”.  This – combined with an analogous 
generational conflict - was also a component of the American animosity to the 
Keynesians which increasingly revealed itself in the early 1930s.   
 
In April 1931, Keynes made some remarks to an American radio audience which, 
according to Stein (1969, 145), were “typical of many that alienated businessmen and 
endeared him to young economists”.  The New York Times reported that Keynes had 
ridiculed the experts who “talk much greater rubbish than an ordinary man can ever 
be capable of”.  At Harvard there was a generational conflict in which the juniors 
regarded many of the seniors as “‘retreads’ who had outlived their usefulness”.  Frank 
Taussig was “the grand old man” of Harvard economics who liked to humiliate 
students with all the venom of a “prosecuting attorney” (Mason 1982, 394, 427; 
Douglas 1972, 33).  Taussig (1932, 356, 359-61) adopted a similar attitude towards 
what he regarded as “quack” economic remedies: “The doctors are sure that most of 
the proposed and advertised remedies for cancer are worthless, or worse than 
worthless – not only do no good, but may do harm.  The economists have the same 
conclusion about sundry popular measures for depressions”.  In his classification 
scheme, “public and private charity … this business of providing for all the claimants 
by indiscriminate relief has its dangers as well as limitations … they may stand in the 
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way of return to health”.  Taussig was very uncertain about the benefits of public 
works: “The very fact that public works are searched for in advance – that they are so 
to speak cooked up – indicates that they are not keenly wanted”.  He also stated that 
he was “unable to see that unemployment insurance or unemployment reserves can 
operate as a preventive”; they should be classed “among the palliatives”.        
 
A few months after this article was published, Kahn (3 March 1933) wrote to Keynes 
from Harvard, explaining that Taussig objected to Kahn’s “arrogance” and his 
“impertinent” approach: he “very much resented my abusive attitude towards the 
businessman … He was appalled that a young man should imagine that he could 
venture to advise the experienced business man. This cocksure attitude of mind was 
typical of the Keynesian school, but was particularly deplorable in the young.  Things 
were far more complicated than was allowed for in my philosophy”.x   
 
Joan Robinson (1977, 8) located the immediate origins of the Keynesian revolution to 
1929 “with a debate about the case for government loan expenditure on public works 
as a means of reducing unemployment ... a great storm of controversy broke out in 
Cambridge” when the Treatise was published.  Advocacy of public works was 
acquiring some revolutionary implications.  Joan Robinson told Keynes (JMK XIV 
[1937], 149-9) her primary motive for writing a “told-to-the-children” Introduction to 
the Theory of Employment was to provide ammunition for the Workers' Education 
Association.  In her attempt to popularise the Keynesian message, Joan Robinson 
(1937, 126-7) noted that the debate over public works gave rise to “violent conflicts 
of interest … the adherents of laissez faire … fear that, if it once became clear to the 
public that state intervention can reduce unemployment, the public might begin to 
think that state intervention could do much else besides”.  Friedman (chapter 2 
[1956], 3) asserted that the “subtle” inter-war Chicago quantity theory “became a 
flexible and sensitive tool for interpreting movements in aggregate economic activity 
and for developing relevant policy prescriptions”.  In contrast, Joan Robinson (1937, 
chapter 10, appendix) contemptuously explained that “For detailed discussion of 
changes in trade activity the Quantity Equation is a weak and treacherous instrument 
… in inexpert hands the Quantity Equation can lead to great confusion”.  She later 
referred to the “pitiful state of confusion” epitomised in the 1930s by the work of 
Frederick Hayek and Henry Simons: “Prices were conceived to be something to do 
with money”.  In the post war period the quantity theory continued to be “so 
implausible” (Robinson 1972, 2, 5).           
 
Kahn’s first multiplier paper appeared in June 1931.  Kahn (1933) presented his 
American multiplier essay on “Public Works and Inflation” at the 1932 joint AEA-
American Statistical Association meeting in Cincinnati.  After the meeting Kahn (10 
February 1933) wrote to Joan Robinson about the “filthy kind of bilge” which passed 
for monetary thought amongst those in America who had not been influenced by 
Keynes (cited by Marcuzzo 2001, 59).  Kahn (30 January 1933) informed Keynes that 
the 1932 AEA meeting “provided a most shocking spectacle.  These people are still 
living in the Dark Ages.  It was all about the helplessness of trying to expand the 
economy … I am thinking that the only way to save humanity is to lead a campaign 
against the Quantity Theory.  I tried it on the [Chicago] Graduate Club here and they 
didn’t very much like it, but didn’t quite know what to say.  These people can see 
nothing absurd in the president elect being ‘opposed to currency inflation but in 
favour of credit inflation’.  I am enjoying the spectacle”.xi   
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Kahn’s Chicago audience may not have enjoyed his sarcastic and supercilious assault 
on orthodox economics.  According to his handwritten notes, Kahn set out the 
“Quantity Equation for hairpins” which Joan Robinson (1933, 23, 22, 26) wrote up in 
October 1933 for the first issue of Review of Economic Studies.  Orthodox economists 
were portrayed as ridiculous figures, analogous to the Pope seeking to outlaw bobbed 
hair on moral grounds.  The “violent revolution” which had taken place in Cambridge 
after the publication of the Treatise had left “many academic economists … 
bewildered”.  The “Analysis of Output” had dethroned the “Theory of Money … once 
Mr Keynes had shown us how to crack the egg, it appears the most natural thing in the 
world to attack the interesting part of the problem directly, instead of through the 
devious route of the Quantity Theory of Money”.  Keynes himself had failed “to 
realize the nature of the revolution that he was carrying through”.  However, “once it 
becomes clear what has happened the confusion disappears”.      
 
Kahn’s (1984, 170-1) “antipathy to the Quantity Theory of Money dated from 
boyhood”.  His animosity made an impression on his audience: “The long and short of 
Mr Kahn’s method of discussion is that, as soon as he notices the faintest trace of 
‘quantity theory’ he no longer bothers about the specific problem or the specific 
argument in question, but tackles the adversary by trying to give him a lesson about 
the true meaning of that ill-fated doctrine” (Neisser 1936, 148).   
 
Keynes’ (JMK XXI, 171-8) essay on the multiplier was published on April Fools 
Day, 1933.  On Independence Day, 1933, Keynes wrote that “What I call the 
Multiplier … may in the United States today be very large indeed” (cited by 
Skidelsky 1992, 491).  Kahn (1933, 168, 173) argued that for recovery it was 
necessary to turn “to the state … it is only in this kind of way that the wheels of 
private investment and spending can be set revolving so that the system could be left 
to carry on once again under its own momentum … This secondary employment, 
which, if I am right, is of an extraordinary magnitude, is usually completely ignored 
in discussions on the adequacy and the cost of various measures for dealing with 
unemployment”.  On 15th April 1933, Alexander Sachs, having just received a visit 
from Kahn, wrote enthusiastically to the prominent New Dealer, Raymond Moley, 
about the much larger value of the American multiplier relative to the British (Freidel 
1972, 430).  Joan Robinson (1937, chapter III) reiterated this message. 
 
On 31 December 1933, Keynes (JMK XXI [1933], 294) published an ‘Open Letter to 
the President’ in the New York Times in which he referred to “a crude economic 
doctrine commonly known as the quantity theory of money”.  To Americans, Keynes’ 
letter sounded “like a letter from a school teacher to the very rich father of a very dull 
pupil” (Stein 1969, 150).  In May 1934, Keynes met both Rex Tugwell and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt with whom he may have taken the opportunity to discuss the 
multiplier; this was certainly the subject of his conversation with the Secretary of 
Labor (Perkins 1946, 226; Barber 1996, 83).  Some economists, however, believed 
that the secondary employment components of the multiplier were “largely 
imaginary” (Kazakevich 1935, 351).  In August 1934, possibly in response to this 
type of scepticism, Roosevelt, at a meeting of the National Emergency Council, asked 
for a precise calculation of the multiplier associated with the public works 
construction projects.  He was told that it would “double to triple the numbers directly 
employed” (Seligman and Cornwell 1965, 276, 131).   
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Douglas (1933b, 52-4) supported countercyclical budgetary policy operating through 
unemployment insurance to “lesson the violence of business fluctuations and hence 
provide a net stabilising effect”.  Douglas explained that the world behaved 
differently from the way “most of us were taught and in turn taught others … this 
naïve view has been well exposed by Wicksell and Keynes”.  Douglas then proceeded 
to make a precise multiplier calculation of 2.8 (1935, 125; 1933c, 12).  Even some 
Keynesians, such as Samuelson (1939, 75), complained that the Keynes-Kahn 
multiplier was becoming an “extremely simplified mechanism ... in danger of 
hardening into a dogma”.    
 
Shortly after Roosevelt’s inauguration, Keynes’ name became closely connected to 
the New Deal.  In June 1933, Calvin Hoover (1965, 149-50) returned to the U.S. 
“obsessed” by the potential parallels between what he had observed in Nazi Germany 
and the consequences of maintaining the “orthodox economics” that had, he thought, 
hitherto dominated Washington: “I was no longer an orthodox economist.  I had 
become a ‘Keynesian’ as early as had Keynes himself”.  In the Theory of 
Unemployment, Pigou (1933, 155-6) argued that “all gratuitous payments to poor 
people and all social services” would reduce the labour demand schedule.  Seymour 
Harris (1934, 324, 314; 1935, 21, 43) regarded this as “an offset to the excessive 
influence of inflation and purchasing power theories”.  Pigou was interpreted as 
having taken “an anti-Keynes and anti-Roosevelt Administration position” and being 
hostile to the “Keynes-Kahn wing of the Cambridge school”.     
 
Thus Keynes became known as the “father of the ‘new’ or ‘non-Hoover’ economics 
… ‘New Deal’ and ‘Keynesianism’ later became synonymous profanities to some 
people” (Stein 1969, 36, 147).  This aroused the suspicions that he was “an evil spirit” 
(Harrod 1951, 448-9).   Keynes reinforced this association.  In spring 1934, during a 
further visit to the United States, the “first thing” Keynes asked Calvin Hoover (1965, 
172) was “What is this ‘Brain Trust’ I read about?”  In June 1934, Keynes presented 
an early version of parts of the General Theory to the American Political Economy 
Club.  Keynes ridiculed “flat earth” microeconomic solutions to real world problems 
which required “central controls” and “sufficient effective demand”.  Keynes learnt 
first hand of the depth of business animosity towards the New Deal.  Yet he 
“commended Washington’s efforts to New York.  The New Deal, he said, had 
aroused his ‘deepest sympathy’” (Skidelsky 1992, 504-7; Moggridge 1992, 582; JMK 
XIII, 456-468; Winch 1969, 234).   
 
Ex-President Herbert Hoover also reinforced a supposed connection between the New 
Deal, Marx, Keynes and inflation.  In October 1936, during the U.S. Presidential 
election campaign, Hoover stated that the “New Deal attack upon free institutions has 
emerged as the transcendent issue in America”.  During his Presidency he had 
“refused national plans to put the government into business in competition with its 
citizens.  That was born of Karl Marx.  I vetoed the idea of recovery through 
stupendous spending to prime the pump.  That was born of a British professor … I 
stopped attempts at currency inflation … That was born of the early Brains Trusters” 
(cited by Leuchtenburg 1968, 203-4). 
 
The same amalgam of suspects reappeared during the post-war anti-communist 
hysteria.  In God and Man at Yale, William F. Buckley Jr. made what was regarded 
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(in the Preface) as a “devastating” case against the Yale Economics Department.  
Students were exposed to textbooks which contained material “brewed out of Keynes, 
the Fabians, and Karl Marx himself” without the countervailing arguments of Ludwig 
von Mises, Frederick Hayek and Knight (Chamberlin 1951, ix).   
 
There were other tensions at Chicago in the 1930s.  Kahn (30 January 1933) referred 
to Douglas as one of Chicago’s “minor men” who he “mildly” liked.xii  But 
Samuelson (1996, 149-150, 154-5) recalled that Douglas was “a reflationist, and not 
on very good terms with Simons and Knight; they regarded him as a power-hungry 
do-gooder”.  Kahn (15 January 1933) reported to Joan Robinson that Douglas’ “work 
has been almost completely ignored over here, where he is regarded as a somewhat 
silly sort of communist politician” (see also Douglas 1976, 905).xiii  Shortly 
afterwards, the Chicago Economics Department erupted into a full-scale internal Civil 
War.  This was “Academic Life on the Battlefront” with Douglas pitted against 
Knight and his disciples, in particular Simons (Stigler 1988, chapter 12; Neff 1973, 
109; Patinkin 1980, 5, n8).  Friedman recalled that Douglas and Knight were at “very 
serious odds with one another.  There was a feud” (cited by Blumenthal 1986, 96-7).  
      
Shortly after this feud, Simons (1962 [1936]) created what Richard Selden (1962, 
323) described as the “Rules Party” with his ‘Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary 
Policy’.  In the same month (February 1936) Keynes (1936, 164, 378, 220-1) 
explained that he had become “somewhat sceptical of the success of a merely 
monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest.  I expect to see the 
State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on 
long views and on the basis of the general social advantage, taking an even greater 
responsibility for directly organising investment … I conceive, therefore, that a 
somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of 
securing an approximation to full employment”.   
 
Samuelson (1996, 148) recalled that “from 1932 to 1936 I was besotted on Frank 
Knight”.  Samuelson (1992, 239) had been taught at Chicago “that business freedom 
and personal freedoms have to be strongly linked”.  But the Keynesians argued that 
business freedom had to be curtailed in the interests of macroeconomic stability.  In 
his review of the General Theory, Knight (chapter 50 [1937], 119) complained that 
Keynes was using the “the language of the soap box reformer” with “phrases like 
socialisation of investment”.  According to his disciples, Keynes “trusted to human 
intelligence.  He hated enslavement by rules.  He wanted governments to have 
discretion and he wanted economists to come to their assistance in the exercise of that 
discretion” (Cairncross 1978, 47-8).  In Aaron Director’s (1948, v) judgement, 
Keynes’ work provided the foundations for “collectivism” while Simons’ work 
provided the foundations for “freedom and equality”. 
 
Simons (chapter 49 [1936]) believed that the General Theory could easily become 
“the economic bible of a fascist movement”.  Keynes’ Treatise, like the General 
Theory was “full of brilliant insights and occasionally devastating criticisms of other 
writers”; but the General Theory was “a revision (if not a repudiation)” of the first 
volume of the Treatise.  Keynes had “now” embarked on a mission which Simons 
found repellent: an authentic genius “becoming the academic idol of our worst cranks 
and charlatans”.       
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Between 1936 and 1951 the Keynesian and Chicagoan paths became even more 
distinctly divergent.  Some of the American Keynesians were “more royalist than the 
King” (Stein 1969, 162).  The anti-Keynesian economists who briefed Herbert Corey 
(1944, 39) drew analogies between Alvin Hansen’s proposals and the concentration of 
power in Stalin’s Russia: “They ask what is it if it is not State Socialism in high gear”.  
Herbert Stein (1995, 11, 220) was a student at Chicago when the General Theory was 
published: “As a contemporary of mine at Chicago, Albert Hart, has said, one could 
be pro-Keynesian or anti-Keynesian, but one could no longer be pre-Keynesian”.xiv   
 
Hansen was regarded as the American Keynes.  Simons (1939, 275) complained that 
if Hansen’ proposals would generate “a continuing contest between the monetary 
authority seeking to raise employment and trade-unions seeking to raise wage rates”.  
Simons also bemoaned that “the gods are surely on his side.  What he proposes is 
exactly what many of us, in our most realistic and despairing moods, foresee ahead as 
the outcome of recent trends”.  If Hansen succeeded in establishing a monetary 
system “dictated by the ad hoc recommendations of economists like himself … the 
outlook is dark indeed”.  
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NOTES 
 
i
 Patinkin (1952; 1956; chapter 36 [1975], 257) interpreted the General Theory as a 
dynamic theory of disequilibrium rather than a static theory of unemployment 
equilibrium.  Referring to “the mechanics of disequilibrium states” Clower (1969 
[1965], 280) argued that the “Keynesian consumption function and other market 
relations involving income as an independent variable cannot be derived explicitly 
from any existing theory of general equilibrium”, adding that “This was apparently 
overlooked by Patinkin [1956] when he formulated his ‘general theory’ of 
macroeconomics”.  In his editorial commentary in Monetary Theory Selected 
Readings Clower (1969, 121) suggested that “Patinkin’s conceptual universe now 
appears to be just a more precise and elaborate portrait of the barter world of Mill, 
Walras and Marshall, its only novel feature being that ‘money’ appears among the set 
of commodities bartered.  The significance of Patinkin’s work thus lies not so much in 
what he says about monetary theory as in what he unintentionally reveals about the 
analytical and empirical weaknesses of established price theory”. 
   
ii
 Patinkin (1979, 157) thought that Keynes’ 1931 performance in Chicago was an 
immodest “song of praise to the Treatise … Keynes apparently knew the Bible – and 
on various occasions (e.g. the ‘widow’s cruse’) even alluded to it – but the verse ‘Let 
another man praise thee, and not thine own mouth’ (Proverbs 27: 2) does not seem to 
have been one of his favourites”.  But Keynes’ fiscal policy prescriptions preceded 
advances in his theory.  As he directing his theoretical vision towards the General 
Theory it was “like the Children of Israel at the foot of Mount Sinai proclaiming, ‘we 
shall do – and we shall listen’”.     
 
iii
 Laidler (1999, 223) noted that the quantity theory tradition to be found in Douglas 
and Director (1931) was “the Cambridge version, as developed by Keynes (1923)”. 
 
iv
 Keynes, however, explained to his mother that he could live in Canada (Moggridge 
1992, 767).  
v
 Even to her admirers she could be highly offensive (Harcourt 1993; 1995a; 1995b).  
When John Kenneth Galbraith (1981, 63) visited her in Cambridge in the early fifties, 
he asked who the promising young Cambridge economist were.  Robinson “looked at 
me sternly, which in her case could be very stern indeed, and said, ‘My dear Ken, we 
were the last good generation’”.   
 
vi
 I am grateful to Don Moggridge for pointing out to me that Kahn’s diet was strictly 
kosher at this time. 
  
vii
 Richard Kahn Papers, RFK/13/90/1/44-51. 
 
viii
 The multiplier that Sweezy believed undermined the Cambridge view was driven 
by an expansion of purchases from non-wage earners’ income caused by the cut in 
money wages.    
 
ix
 After Britain left the gold standard, Keynes abandoned his advocacy of a tariff.  On 
28 September 1931 he wrote to the Times that “the immediate question for attention is 
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not a tariff but the currency question” (JMK IX, 243; Moggridge 1992, 529). 
   
x
 Keynes Papers, L/K/43-4. 
 
xi
 Keynes Papers, L/K/35-8.  Kahn’s judgment is supported by Willis and Chapman 
(1935, 56) who report that in 1933-4 amongst public officials and their economic 
advisers there was an “uncritical acceptance of the view that changes in the money 
unit would be immediately reflected in similar changes of commodity prices”. 
 
xii
 Keynes Papers, L/K/35-8.   
 
xiii
 Richard Kahn Papers, RFK/13/90/1/44-51. 
 
xiv
 (See Hart 1948, vii).  Stein continued: “the Chicagoans took a middle-of-the-road, 
‘none of the above’ point of view” towards the General Theory.  
 
